SINGAPORE: Earlier this month, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly voted (142 to 10, with 12 abstentions) to endorse the “New York Declaration” detailing a path forward to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the end of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
On the back of the Declaration, several member states, including G7 powers Britain and Canada, on Sunday (Sep 21) moved to formally recognise the State of Palestine. They join 147 of the UN’s 193 member states that have already done so. Several more nations, including France, Luxembourg and Malta, are expected to make their formal announcement at a special UN conference this week.
Singapore, on its part, is prepared to reconsider its position on recognising a Palestinian state if the situation continues to deteriorate, said Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan in parliament on Monday.
In the face of this diplomatic momentum, Israel remains defiant. Its unrelenting assault on Gaza continues, while plans to further annex territories in the West Bank, deemed illegal under international law, gather pace. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not only categorically rejected the two-state solution, but also the very right of Palestine to exist.
This impasse highlights the harsh reality that the road to recognition of Palestine is paved with some hard truths. First, without the agreement of Israel and support from the US, there can be no sovereign Palestinian state. Second, it is questionable how far recognition of Palestine under current circumstances can transform the present-day situation on the ground for Gazans.
At first glance, it is instinctively difficult to argue against recognition. Grieved by the images of suffering unfolding in Gaza, most people will take the view that recognition must be the right thing to do.
However, reality tends to be more complicated. First, recognition should reflect the aspirations of Palestinians and not be used as leverage to shape Israeli conduct of its war against Hamas. These are separate issues.
Second, some of the G7 powers that have moved to recognise Palestine recently have done so with specific conditions including the need for a ceasefire, the exclusion of Hamas from the political process, and support for the two-state solution. In truth, these conditions are not too different from those of other states that already support full UN membership for Palestine. This includes Singapore.
In his ministerial statement on Monday, Mr Balakrishnan spoke out against Israeli actions, reiterated Singapore’s readiness to recognise Palestine once specific conditions are met, and articulated measures Singapore will continue to take to help address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Indeed, a State of Palestine is currently recognised by three-quarters of the international community, albeit without the accoutrements of statehood. Yet this status has provided cold comfort for the people of Gaza. More importantly, so long as the US and Israel, the two most pivotal actors in this tortured script, withhold their support, a full-fledged Palestinian state simply cannot come into existence.
What are the present prospects of a bona fide Palestinian state coming into being? To begin answering this question, it is perhaps apropos to start with the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which established the foundational characteristics of sovereign statehood. These include a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to conduct relations with other states.
How does today’s Palestine fare by these measures?
At first glance, there might be no question of the presence of a permanent Palestinian population despite all manner of efforts to dispossess them. But there is more to it than meets the eye. There are, according to UN Palestinian relief agency UNRWA, almost 6 million Palestinian refugees, who for historical reasons had been forced to leave their homes. How a sovereign Palestinian state deals with them politically and administratively must surely factor into the equation of statehood.
Palestinian land is currently non-contiguous, with Gaza and the West Bank separated by 40km of Israeli territory. While the totemic slogan “from the river to the sea” commands currency in Palestinian nationalist circles, it fails to acknowledge the legitimate rights of Israel and hence is a non-starter.
Likewise, the desire of “purist” Palestinian nationalists for Jerusalem to be recognised as the capital of an independent Palestine is dead in the water. As a territorial concept it is also at odds with the two-state solution which, though resoundingly rejected in both Israel and Palestine today, remains the only viable configuration.
Land that is currently under Palestinian Authority administration is only titularly so. Israel controls everything from physical access to security, water and taxation. No doubt, such a situation is untenable for Palestinians. Yet precisely for that reason, a clear path forward on borders and institutional capacity is imperative if an independent Palestine is not to become a failed state overnight.
And finally, there is currently no entity that can claim support from the majority of Palestinians, and that is equipped to run the country. The ideological underpinnings of Palestinian self-determination movements have always differed sharply, if not violently - consider what Hamas did to fellow Palestinians from Fatah after winning power in Gaza in 2007, sowing the seeds of deep distrust, if not outright hostility, between the two. In the same vein, years of corruption and ineptitude has diminished the legitimacy of Fatah considerably in the eyes of the Palestinian people.
Let’s be clear. It was Hamas that triggered the latest round of violence in Gaza which inflicted a deep wound in the Israeli national psyche, and which many Israeli leaders use to justify their heavy-handed response. Yet despite the global consensus that Hamas must have no part in the future of Palestine, there is little indication that they are prepared to disarm and disengage.
Polls conducted in May this year by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research show most Gazans oppose the disarming of Hamas. This might have something to do with their belief that Israel will not end the war even if Hamas disarms. Read together, this spells trouble for prospects of a political landscape sans Hamas.
And lest we forget, Hamas and its allies still hold almost 50 hostages, including 20 believed to still be alive. Full recognition must surely involve their release, but this will require Hamas to surrender the only real leverage it currently possesses.
At the same time, the Israeli objective of eliminating Hamas permanently by military means will simply not succeed. Even if Hamas is wiped out today, the actions of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza have all but ensured the ideology that created the militant organisation will endure.
For these reasons then, the issue of recognition is in fact much more complex than merely an issue of recognition.
All this raises a troubling question: Is there then an alternative path to peace, pragmatism and partnership in the Middle East that can break this cycle of conflict?
It is indeed difficult at present to see any light at the end of this long, arduous tunnel. Nevertheless, the discussion could perhaps start with the matter of mutual recognition.
At present, several Arab and Muslim majority countries do not recognise Israel, even if some have discreetly pursued economic relations with them. If a two-state solution remains elusive, would “mutual recognition” of some sort - without Hamas - be something concerned parties are prepared to place on the table?
All this is not to deny the hope - and rights - of Palestinians for their own state and homeland. But hope is not a strategy.
Without clarity on who leads Palestine on a path to a viable and functional state and a stable economic and political future, the inconvenient truth is that hasty recognition today risks creating even bigger problems tomorrow. Indeed, it is for this very reason that the New York Declaration tried to outline a pathway forward. But it also means we are not there yet.
Joseph Chinyong Liow is Chairman of the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.
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On the back of the Declaration, several member states, including G7 powers Britain and Canada, on Sunday (Sep 21) moved to formally recognise the State of Palestine. They join 147 of the UN’s 193 member states that have already done so. Several more nations, including France, Luxembourg and Malta, are expected to make their formal announcement at a special UN conference this week.
Singapore, on its part, is prepared to reconsider its position on recognising a Palestinian state if the situation continues to deteriorate, said Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan in parliament on Monday.
In the face of this diplomatic momentum, Israel remains defiant. Its unrelenting assault on Gaza continues, while plans to further annex territories in the West Bank, deemed illegal under international law, gather pace. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not only categorically rejected the two-state solution, but also the very right of Palestine to exist.
This impasse highlights the harsh reality that the road to recognition of Palestine is paved with some hard truths. First, without the agreement of Israel and support from the US, there can be no sovereign Palestinian state. Second, it is questionable how far recognition of Palestine under current circumstances can transform the present-day situation on the ground for Gazans.
Related:


IS RECOGNITION A “MORAL” IMPERATIVE?
At first glance, it is instinctively difficult to argue against recognition. Grieved by the images of suffering unfolding in Gaza, most people will take the view that recognition must be the right thing to do.
However, reality tends to be more complicated. First, recognition should reflect the aspirations of Palestinians and not be used as leverage to shape Israeli conduct of its war against Hamas. These are separate issues.
Second, some of the G7 powers that have moved to recognise Palestine recently have done so with specific conditions including the need for a ceasefire, the exclusion of Hamas from the political process, and support for the two-state solution. In truth, these conditions are not too different from those of other states that already support full UN membership for Palestine. This includes Singapore.
In his ministerial statement on Monday, Mr Balakrishnan spoke out against Israeli actions, reiterated Singapore’s readiness to recognise Palestine once specific conditions are met, and articulated measures Singapore will continue to take to help address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Indeed, a State of Palestine is currently recognised by three-quarters of the international community, albeit without the accoutrements of statehood. Yet this status has provided cold comfort for the people of Gaza. More importantly, so long as the US and Israel, the two most pivotal actors in this tortured script, withhold their support, a full-fledged Palestinian state simply cannot come into existence.
Related:

WHAT MAKES A STATE A STATE?
What are the present prospects of a bona fide Palestinian state coming into being? To begin answering this question, it is perhaps apropos to start with the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which established the foundational characteristics of sovereign statehood. These include a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to conduct relations with other states.
How does today’s Palestine fare by these measures?
At first glance, there might be no question of the presence of a permanent Palestinian population despite all manner of efforts to dispossess them. But there is more to it than meets the eye. There are, according to UN Palestinian relief agency UNRWA, almost 6 million Palestinian refugees, who for historical reasons had been forced to leave their homes. How a sovereign Palestinian state deals with them politically and administratively must surely factor into the equation of statehood.
Palestinian land is currently non-contiguous, with Gaza and the West Bank separated by 40km of Israeli territory. While the totemic slogan “from the river to the sea” commands currency in Palestinian nationalist circles, it fails to acknowledge the legitimate rights of Israel and hence is a non-starter.
Likewise, the desire of “purist” Palestinian nationalists for Jerusalem to be recognised as the capital of an independent Palestine is dead in the water. As a territorial concept it is also at odds with the two-state solution which, though resoundingly rejected in both Israel and Palestine today, remains the only viable configuration.
Land that is currently under Palestinian Authority administration is only titularly so. Israel controls everything from physical access to security, water and taxation. No doubt, such a situation is untenable for Palestinians. Yet precisely for that reason, a clear path forward on borders and institutional capacity is imperative if an independent Palestine is not to become a failed state overnight.
And finally, there is currently no entity that can claim support from the majority of Palestinians, and that is equipped to run the country. The ideological underpinnings of Palestinian self-determination movements have always differed sharply, if not violently - consider what Hamas did to fellow Palestinians from Fatah after winning power in Gaza in 2007, sowing the seeds of deep distrust, if not outright hostility, between the two. In the same vein, years of corruption and ineptitude has diminished the legitimacy of Fatah considerably in the eyes of the Palestinian people.
Related:

HAMAS OR NO HAMAS?
Let’s be clear. It was Hamas that triggered the latest round of violence in Gaza which inflicted a deep wound in the Israeli national psyche, and which many Israeli leaders use to justify their heavy-handed response. Yet despite the global consensus that Hamas must have no part in the future of Palestine, there is little indication that they are prepared to disarm and disengage.
Polls conducted in May this year by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research show most Gazans oppose the disarming of Hamas. This might have something to do with their belief that Israel will not end the war even if Hamas disarms. Read together, this spells trouble for prospects of a political landscape sans Hamas.
And lest we forget, Hamas and its allies still hold almost 50 hostages, including 20 believed to still be alive. Full recognition must surely involve their release, but this will require Hamas to surrender the only real leverage it currently possesses.
At the same time, the Israeli objective of eliminating Hamas permanently by military means will simply not succeed. Even if Hamas is wiped out today, the actions of the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza have all but ensured the ideology that created the militant organisation will endure.
For these reasons then, the issue of recognition is in fact much more complex than merely an issue of recognition.
All this raises a troubling question: Is there then an alternative path to peace, pragmatism and partnership in the Middle East that can break this cycle of conflict?
It is indeed difficult at present to see any light at the end of this long, arduous tunnel. Nevertheless, the discussion could perhaps start with the matter of mutual recognition.
At present, several Arab and Muslim majority countries do not recognise Israel, even if some have discreetly pursued economic relations with them. If a two-state solution remains elusive, would “mutual recognition” of some sort - without Hamas - be something concerned parties are prepared to place on the table?
All this is not to deny the hope - and rights - of Palestinians for their own state and homeland. But hope is not a strategy.
Without clarity on who leads Palestine on a path to a viable and functional state and a stable economic and political future, the inconvenient truth is that hasty recognition today risks creating even bigger problems tomorrow. Indeed, it is for this very reason that the New York Declaration tried to outline a pathway forward. But it also means we are not there yet.
Joseph Chinyong Liow is Chairman of the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.
Related:

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