SINGAPORE: As unpredictable as United States President Donald Trump may sometimes be, the decision to strike Venezuela and seize its leader Nicolas Maduro on Saturday (Jan 3) was not taken on a whim.
It was clearly calculated to send a message about America’s power and interests – and its ability and willingness to mobilise one to advance the other. The question is whether it was the only message that everyone else received.
The writing was on the wall for Maduro: In his first term, Mr Trump had refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Maduro presidency. Since his return to the White House, Mr Trump authorised CIA operations in Venezuela, sank its vessels suspected of trafficking drugs into the US and seized oil tankers.
Still, the military action in Venezuela by the Trump administration shocked the world – notwithstanding the fact that the US had something of a precedent in the 1989 invasion of Panama and capture of its leader Manuel Noriega.
The official narrative is that Maduro’s removal was a law enforcement operation to capture a fugitive wanted in the US for drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. But Mr Trump has obfuscated the story by planning to take control of Venezuelan oil, saying that the US would run the country and exerting blatant pressure on Delcy Rodriguez’s interim government.
There are undoubtedly larger strategic imperatives at work and hard realities for the rest of the world.
The Trump administration had made plain its desire to assert American primacy and dominance in what it considers its own backyard. The close ties that Venezuela had built over the years with Russia, Iran, Cuba and China would not have escaped observers; nor would the fact that the operation took place just hours after Maduro met with senior Chinese officials in Caracas.
And if the US can wield its power in the Western Hemisphere with little regard for international law – and little consequence – concerns have been expressed that other big powers might feel emboldened in their expansionist ambitions.
The US, it is argued, has provided a template and legal “justification” for others that might consider similar measures to remove disagreeable leaders from power.
These comparisons are misplaced.
For a start, big powers don’t need any precedent or encouragement. Some have already embarked on “military operations” of their own and on a scale that dwarfs what the US might realistically consider doing in their own backyard.
While there might be some interest in the legal justification of the Venezuelan raid, in the larger scheme of things no big power will let the legalese of the “rules-based order” obstruct their pursuit of what they deem to be their core interests.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s landmark 2016 ruling in favour of the Philippines has not altered Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, nor has violating international law halted the Russian invasion of Ukraine which will soon reach its fourth year.
Of course, the US has effectively ceded any moral high ground if it seeks to condemn the adventurism of others. But again, moral high ground was never meaningful currency against big powers set on exercising their might in the first place.
If one compares the Western Hemisphere to the Asia-Pacific, one quickly recognises the stark difference in geopolitical realities.
Simply put, US dominance in the Western Hemisphere is unquestionable, and indeed, unchallenged. None of the big powers in Asia, whether Russia, China, India or Japan, can afford the luxury that the US enjoys in the Americas, because of their overlapping – and competing – core interests.
While the geographical distance between Venezuela and Singapore is considerable, there remain key lessons.
First, Venezuela is yet another stark reminder that small states live in increasingly perilous times. Great power politics are moving the world away from the rule of law to the law of the jungle.
To borrow a notion from the Netflix hit series, Stranger Things, it is the “Upside Down” that coexists with – and disrupts, with potentially devastating consequences – an international society predicated on laws and rules.
Let’s be clear: Great powers will play by rules when these suit their interests, but they are not averse to disregarding or blatantly undermining the rules that do not. And they will be unapologetic about it.
Second, it is precisely this reality that, ironically, reinforces the need for international law and rules.
Regardless of their imperfections and limitations, rules remain important because they facilitate cooperation and provide a modicum of stability and certainty. After all, while big powers may disregard rules when dealing with weaker small states, they would be less inclined to do so when dealing with states with greater economic or military firepower.
Moreover, rules are important for small states because they provide a shared basis and platform to make common cause, and this ability to harness strength in numbers will be increasingly critical to coordinate interests when great powers begin throwing their weight around.
It is for this reason that even in the face of the brazen exercise of power, the importance of rules in the international system must continue to be emphasised: not as a trope or naive expression of lofty moral ideals, but as principle upon which the interests and existence of small states rests.
Finally, Singapore has had, and must continue to have, good relations with big powers in keeping with its own national interests, whether for reasons of market access, technology development or defence cooperation.
But we must be clear-eyed about these relationships. Whether in the Western Hemisphere, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East or the Arctic, the fact is that big powers don’t deal in altruism, not least when their interests are at stake.
While Stranger Things came to an end last week, the geopolitical "Upside Down" is here to stay. How small states can survive and flourish within this new reality is going to be the challenge of the age.
Professor Joseph Liow Chinyong is Dean and Wang Gungwu Professor in East Asian Affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
Continue reading...
It was clearly calculated to send a message about America’s power and interests – and its ability and willingness to mobilise one to advance the other. The question is whether it was the only message that everyone else received.
The writing was on the wall for Maduro: In his first term, Mr Trump had refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Maduro presidency. Since his return to the White House, Mr Trump authorised CIA operations in Venezuela, sank its vessels suspected of trafficking drugs into the US and seized oil tankers.
Still, the military action in Venezuela by the Trump administration shocked the world – notwithstanding the fact that the US had something of a precedent in the 1989 invasion of Panama and capture of its leader Manuel Noriega.
The official narrative is that Maduro’s removal was a law enforcement operation to capture a fugitive wanted in the US for drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. But Mr Trump has obfuscated the story by planning to take control of Venezuelan oil, saying that the US would run the country and exerting blatant pressure on Delcy Rodriguez’s interim government.
There are undoubtedly larger strategic imperatives at work and hard realities for the rest of the world.
SPECULATING WHAT OTHER BIG POWERS MAY BE THINKING
The Trump administration had made plain its desire to assert American primacy and dominance in what it considers its own backyard. The close ties that Venezuela had built over the years with Russia, Iran, Cuba and China would not have escaped observers; nor would the fact that the operation took place just hours after Maduro met with senior Chinese officials in Caracas.
And if the US can wield its power in the Western Hemisphere with little regard for international law – and little consequence – concerns have been expressed that other big powers might feel emboldened in their expansionist ambitions.
The US, it is argued, has provided a template and legal “justification” for others that might consider similar measures to remove disagreeable leaders from power.
Related:
These comparisons are misplaced.
For a start, big powers don’t need any precedent or encouragement. Some have already embarked on “military operations” of their own and on a scale that dwarfs what the US might realistically consider doing in their own backyard.
While there might be some interest in the legal justification of the Venezuelan raid, in the larger scheme of things no big power will let the legalese of the “rules-based order” obstruct their pursuit of what they deem to be their core interests.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s landmark 2016 ruling in favour of the Philippines has not altered Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, nor has violating international law halted the Russian invasion of Ukraine which will soon reach its fourth year.
Of course, the US has effectively ceded any moral high ground if it seeks to condemn the adventurism of others. But again, moral high ground was never meaningful currency against big powers set on exercising their might in the first place.
If one compares the Western Hemisphere to the Asia-Pacific, one quickly recognises the stark difference in geopolitical realities.
Simply put, US dominance in the Western Hemisphere is unquestionable, and indeed, unchallenged. None of the big powers in Asia, whether Russia, China, India or Japan, can afford the luxury that the US enjoys in the Americas, because of their overlapping – and competing – core interests.
LESSONS FOR SINGAPORE
While the geographical distance between Venezuela and Singapore is considerable, there remain key lessons.
First, Venezuela is yet another stark reminder that small states live in increasingly perilous times. Great power politics are moving the world away from the rule of law to the law of the jungle.
To borrow a notion from the Netflix hit series, Stranger Things, it is the “Upside Down” that coexists with – and disrupts, with potentially devastating consequences – an international society predicated on laws and rules.
Let’s be clear: Great powers will play by rules when these suit their interests, but they are not averse to disregarding or blatantly undermining the rules that do not. And they will be unapologetic about it.
Second, it is precisely this reality that, ironically, reinforces the need for international law and rules.
Regardless of their imperfections and limitations, rules remain important because they facilitate cooperation and provide a modicum of stability and certainty. After all, while big powers may disregard rules when dealing with weaker small states, they would be less inclined to do so when dealing with states with greater economic or military firepower.
Related:
Moreover, rules are important for small states because they provide a shared basis and platform to make common cause, and this ability to harness strength in numbers will be increasingly critical to coordinate interests when great powers begin throwing their weight around.
It is for this reason that even in the face of the brazen exercise of power, the importance of rules in the international system must continue to be emphasised: not as a trope or naive expression of lofty moral ideals, but as principle upon which the interests and existence of small states rests.
Finally, Singapore has had, and must continue to have, good relations with big powers in keeping with its own national interests, whether for reasons of market access, technology development or defence cooperation.
But we must be clear-eyed about these relationships. Whether in the Western Hemisphere, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East or the Arctic, the fact is that big powers don’t deal in altruism, not least when their interests are at stake.
While Stranger Things came to an end last week, the geopolitical "Upside Down" is here to stay. How small states can survive and flourish within this new reality is going to be the challenge of the age.
Professor Joseph Liow Chinyong is Dean and Wang Gungwu Professor in East Asian Affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
Continue reading...