SINGAPORE: If at any one of at least half a dozen turning points during the tumultuous year leading to the breakup a different path had been chosen, the course of history might have changed forever.
That the fate of 8.6 million people including 1.8 million in Singapore hung so finely in the balance depending on the actions of a handful is both fascinating and sobering.
This was what struck me most after reading 488 pages of the book, The Albatross File: Separation Declassified, launched on Sunday (Dec 7), which contains documents in a secret file kept by Singapore’s then Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee and oral history interviews by the key players involved in the separation.
If Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had been detained by Malaysian authorities, which was being actively considered at the time, there might not have been an independent Singapore.
If the British had not stopped the plans being discussed to have a looser constitutional arrangement to ease tension between the two sides, the eventual breakup might not have occurred.
If Mr Goh had not decided to act on his own and been so quick to make up his mind about how to resolve these troublesome issues, the outcome would have been more uncertain.
Nothing was determined until the final hour, everything could have changed in a moment.
Of all the ifs, the most dramatic concerns Mr Lee’s possible arrest.
None other than Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman thought it was necessary to remove Mr Lee whom he believed to be the source of his problems.
He told British High Commissioner Anthony Head when they met on Jun 1, 1965, that he did not trust Mr Lee and was ‘completely disillusioned with him.’
When Lord Head asked the Tunku how all this was going to end, the latter said ominously: “I know my duty and I shall not hesitate to do it.”
Pressed if he was considering detaining Lee, the Tunku replied that he was.
When the British diplomat warned that such an action would be unwise and would lead to Britain reassessing its commitment to defend Malaysia against Confrontation by Indonesia, the Tunku responded defiantly: “Very well then, I should have to make peace with Indonesia.’
It is the clearest indication from these declassified materials that Mr Lee’s arrest was discussed at the highest level and that British pressure stopped it from being carried out.
But if the Tunku could not arrest Mr Lee without incurring British displeasure, how would he deal with his own constituency in Kuala Lumpur from Malay leaders who were demanding action because they were incensed by Mr Lee, particularly his speech in the Kuala Lumpur parliament a few days earlier when he attacked the federal government's policies and called on it to change its Malay-centric approach?
Forced to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea, the Tunku chose the other option open to him: Cut off Singapore from the mainland and, as he would say later, “remove the gangrene from the body”.
Was there another way, apart from separation or Mr Lee’s detention?
A looser constitutional arrangement in which Singapore would have more autonomy over matters such as finance and the economy, with defence and foreign affairs under federal control was an idea pursued by both sides in 1964 after the deadly racial riots in July that year.
The merger was not working and something had to be done or there might be more violence in the streets.
No progress was made towards having some other arrangement which might ease the tension between the two sides.
If – and it is another big if – both sides had worked harder and been more prepared to make compromises might a looser constitutional arrangement have prevented separation?
Mr Lee was asked about this in his oral history interviews (1981-1982) and he said it would have to be like what it was in 1959 when the People’s Action Party (PAP) won its first election in self-governing Singapore exercising autonomy in all areas except defence and foreign affairs.
“We should have been more or less on our own … and gradually over 20, 30 years brought into one society. That would have been more likely to have worked,” he said.
“And even then I am not altogether certain (that) we would have been integrated painlessly… I think there would have been conflicts because there was a fundamental difference… It would have been increasingly difficult as we got integrated and we got involved in each other’s affairs ...”
In reality though, this particular ‘if’ was never really on the cards because of the toxic nature of the relationship that centred on fundamental differences on both sides about what the union meant, how much autonomy Singapore could exercise without federal interference and whether Malay rule in the newly-formed nation would continue unchallenged.
Reconciliation was made even more difficult when the PAP decided to put pressure on KL by working with other opposition parties in the mainland, Sabah and Sarawak, to oppose communal policies and fight for a multiracial society.
Founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew could not sleep for three nights before Singapore’s separation from Malaysia — and before his tearful moment on television.
It is now clear from these documents that the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) wasn’t just a matter of principle for a Malaysian Malaysia but a strategy to gain an upper hand in the fight for political ground.
In a note to the Singapore Cabinet on Feb 15, 1965, Mr Lee wrote: “We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into silence by the expectation that there may be re-arrangements which make counterattacks on them unnecessary, or worse, unwise , as this may affect our getting an advantage in the rearrangement … We have to also consider going up to organise meetings in Malacca, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur and Penang, where the battle can be taken to their home ground.”
The formation of the MSC was a major cause of the widening rift between the two sides leading ultimately to the Tunku deciding on nothing less than a complete break with Singapore.
Did the PAP overplay its hand? How could it not know the consequences of taking the battle to the mainland, in open opposition to KL?
PAP leaders knew they were fighting fire with fire but the alternative was worse – total submission to communal violence.
They came to the conclusion that the racial riots in Singapore in July 1964, which left 23 persons dead and more than 400 injured, were started by Malay extremists in UMNO.
In his memoirs, The Singapore Story, Lee wrote: “We had to find a counter to this system of intimidation through race riots, with Chinese being killed and maimed wherever they dared to resist Malay domination. We decided that one effective defence would be to link the opposition in all towns in the Federation in one network, so that a riot in one major city triggered off riots in others to a point where the police and army would be unable to cope, and all hell would be let loose … any communal intimidation by Kuala Lumpur would risk tearing Malaysia apart.”
It seems unimaginable now that what Mr Lee described might have taken place – deadly riots breaking out in every town – and that he was contemplating a course of action that might lead to more bloodshed.
These were dangerous times and it showed how resolute PAP leaders were in refusing to be intimidated and submit to the threat of violence.
If they were not, multiracialism might not have survived to become a defining feature of modern Singapore.
It is another intriguing ”if” in the Singapore story.
With so much uncertainty and angst, the end to the union and all the problems it had brought, came as a relief to those in the thick of it.
Mr Goh’s account of how he first discussed it with Tun Abdul Razak when they met on Jul 15, 1965 is revealing about their state of mind, like a couple contemplating divorce but with neither party wanting to be the first to broach the subject.
After “the usual belly-aching session against Lee”, Mr Goh recounted in his oral history interview, Tun Razak asked Mr Goh: “Do you have any suggestions to offer?”
Mr Goh told the interviewer: “I must confess that I was taken aback because I was totally unprepared that … he wanted some proposals from me … And I said, so the best thing would be to call it quits, and that we should go our separate ways … we leave Malaysia, become an independent country, and you’ll be relieved of all these troubles, and we would have also been relieved of troubles from you.”
It is now known that the Tunku had already decided on separation while he was hospitalised in London and that he had informed Tun Razak to discuss it with Singapore ministers.
Tun Razak’s remarks to Mr Goh were therefore pre-planned but he had no idea what the response might be.
If Mr Goh had not been so quick on his feet when asked, who knows what might have taken place instead?
Malaysia’s then deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak (left), with Singapore’s then finance minister, Goh Keng Swee.
The 25 days between him uttering those words and separation were a dizzying spell of intense activities, and anything could have happened to thwart their plan: Documents had to be prepared, the Constitution of both countries amended, heated discussions with ministers who opposed the plan, and, most tricky of all, keeping all this under wraps from the British who might have scuttled it if they found out.
The story of Singapore’s separation was not pre-determined nor could it have been predicted given all the ifs and buts along the way.
On some issues the protagonists were prepared to consider options and listen to what the other side had to say.
But on the most critical, no one was ready to give way; everyone held his ground.
Singapore would not compromise on its stand that the country be run on multiracial lines and that all are equal before the law.
Malaysia would not countenance any challenge to Malay rule.
No ifs and buts over these two existential issues.
In the end, it wasn't, if not separation, what? But how quickly to do it before more blood was shed.
Han Fook Kwang was a veteran newspaper editor and is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also co-author of the book, Lee Kuan Yew: The man and his ideas, and Lee Kuan Yew: Hard truths to keep Singapore going
Continue reading...
That the fate of 8.6 million people including 1.8 million in Singapore hung so finely in the balance depending on the actions of a handful is both fascinating and sobering.
This was what struck me most after reading 488 pages of the book, The Albatross File: Separation Declassified, launched on Sunday (Dec 7), which contains documents in a secret file kept by Singapore’s then Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee and oral history interviews by the key players involved in the separation.
If Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had been detained by Malaysian authorities, which was being actively considered at the time, there might not have been an independent Singapore.
If the British had not stopped the plans being discussed to have a looser constitutional arrangement to ease tension between the two sides, the eventual breakup might not have occurred.
If Mr Goh had not decided to act on his own and been so quick to make up his mind about how to resolve these troublesome issues, the outcome would have been more uncertain.
Nothing was determined until the final hour, everything could have changed in a moment.
IF LEE KUAN YEW WAS ARRESTED
Of all the ifs, the most dramatic concerns Mr Lee’s possible arrest.
None other than Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman thought it was necessary to remove Mr Lee whom he believed to be the source of his problems.
He told British High Commissioner Anthony Head when they met on Jun 1, 1965, that he did not trust Mr Lee and was ‘completely disillusioned with him.’
When Lord Head asked the Tunku how all this was going to end, the latter said ominously: “I know my duty and I shall not hesitate to do it.”
Pressed if he was considering detaining Lee, the Tunku replied that he was.
When the British diplomat warned that such an action would be unwise and would lead to Britain reassessing its commitment to defend Malaysia against Confrontation by Indonesia, the Tunku responded defiantly: “Very well then, I should have to make peace with Indonesia.’
It is the clearest indication from these declassified materials that Mr Lee’s arrest was discussed at the highest level and that British pressure stopped it from being carried out.
Related:
But if the Tunku could not arrest Mr Lee without incurring British displeasure, how would he deal with his own constituency in Kuala Lumpur from Malay leaders who were demanding action because they were incensed by Mr Lee, particularly his speech in the Kuala Lumpur parliament a few days earlier when he attacked the federal government's policies and called on it to change its Malay-centric approach?
Forced to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea, the Tunku chose the other option open to him: Cut off Singapore from the mainland and, as he would say later, “remove the gangrene from the body”.
WAS THERE A THIRD WAY?
Was there another way, apart from separation or Mr Lee’s detention?
A looser constitutional arrangement in which Singapore would have more autonomy over matters such as finance and the economy, with defence and foreign affairs under federal control was an idea pursued by both sides in 1964 after the deadly racial riots in July that year.
The merger was not working and something had to be done or there might be more violence in the streets.
No progress was made towards having some other arrangement which might ease the tension between the two sides.
If – and it is another big if – both sides had worked harder and been more prepared to make compromises might a looser constitutional arrangement have prevented separation?
Mr Lee was asked about this in his oral history interviews (1981-1982) and he said it would have to be like what it was in 1959 when the People’s Action Party (PAP) won its first election in self-governing Singapore exercising autonomy in all areas except defence and foreign affairs.
“We should have been more or less on our own … and gradually over 20, 30 years brought into one society. That would have been more likely to have worked,” he said.
“And even then I am not altogether certain (that) we would have been integrated painlessly… I think there would have been conflicts because there was a fundamental difference… It would have been increasingly difficult as we got integrated and we got involved in each other’s affairs ...”
In reality though, this particular ‘if’ was never really on the cards because of the toxic nature of the relationship that centred on fundamental differences on both sides about what the union meant, how much autonomy Singapore could exercise without federal interference and whether Malay rule in the newly-formed nation would continue unchallenged.
Reconciliation was made even more difficult when the PAP decided to put pressure on KL by working with other opposition parties in the mainland, Sabah and Sarawak, to oppose communal policies and fight for a multiracial society.
Founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew could not sleep for three nights before Singapore’s separation from Malaysia — and before his tearful moment on television.
It is now clear from these documents that the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) wasn’t just a matter of principle for a Malaysian Malaysia but a strategy to gain an upper hand in the fight for political ground.
In a note to the Singapore Cabinet on Feb 15, 1965, Mr Lee wrote: “We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into silence by the expectation that there may be re-arrangements which make counterattacks on them unnecessary, or worse, unwise , as this may affect our getting an advantage in the rearrangement … We have to also consider going up to organise meetings in Malacca, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur and Penang, where the battle can be taken to their home ground.”
The formation of the MSC was a major cause of the widening rift between the two sides leading ultimately to the Tunku deciding on nothing less than a complete break with Singapore.
Did the PAP overplay its hand? How could it not know the consequences of taking the battle to the mainland, in open opposition to KL?
PAP leaders knew they were fighting fire with fire but the alternative was worse – total submission to communal violence.
They came to the conclusion that the racial riots in Singapore in July 1964, which left 23 persons dead and more than 400 injured, were started by Malay extremists in UMNO.
In his memoirs, The Singapore Story, Lee wrote: “We had to find a counter to this system of intimidation through race riots, with Chinese being killed and maimed wherever they dared to resist Malay domination. We decided that one effective defence would be to link the opposition in all towns in the Federation in one network, so that a riot in one major city triggered off riots in others to a point where the police and army would be unable to cope, and all hell would be let loose … any communal intimidation by Kuala Lumpur would risk tearing Malaysia apart.”
It seems unimaginable now that what Mr Lee described might have taken place – deadly riots breaking out in every town – and that he was contemplating a course of action that might lead to more bloodshed.
These were dangerous times and it showed how resolute PAP leaders were in refusing to be intimidated and submit to the threat of violence.
If they were not, multiracialism might not have survived to become a defining feature of modern Singapore.
It is another intriguing ”if” in the Singapore story.
Related:
With so much uncertainty and angst, the end to the union and all the problems it had brought, came as a relief to those in the thick of it.
Mr Goh’s account of how he first discussed it with Tun Abdul Razak when they met on Jul 15, 1965 is revealing about their state of mind, like a couple contemplating divorce but with neither party wanting to be the first to broach the subject.
After “the usual belly-aching session against Lee”, Mr Goh recounted in his oral history interview, Tun Razak asked Mr Goh: “Do you have any suggestions to offer?”
Mr Goh told the interviewer: “I must confess that I was taken aback because I was totally unprepared that … he wanted some proposals from me … And I said, so the best thing would be to call it quits, and that we should go our separate ways … we leave Malaysia, become an independent country, and you’ll be relieved of all these troubles, and we would have also been relieved of troubles from you.”
It is now known that the Tunku had already decided on separation while he was hospitalised in London and that he had informed Tun Razak to discuss it with Singapore ministers.
Tun Razak’s remarks to Mr Goh were therefore pre-planned but he had no idea what the response might be.
If Mr Goh had not been so quick on his feet when asked, who knows what might have taken place instead?
Malaysia’s then deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak (left), with Singapore’s then finance minister, Goh Keng Swee.
MANY IFS AND BUTS, BUT IT CAME DOWN TO THESE
The 25 days between him uttering those words and separation were a dizzying spell of intense activities, and anything could have happened to thwart their plan: Documents had to be prepared, the Constitution of both countries amended, heated discussions with ministers who opposed the plan, and, most tricky of all, keeping all this under wraps from the British who might have scuttled it if they found out.
The story of Singapore’s separation was not pre-determined nor could it have been predicted given all the ifs and buts along the way.
On some issues the protagonists were prepared to consider options and listen to what the other side had to say.
But on the most critical, no one was ready to give way; everyone held his ground.
Singapore would not compromise on its stand that the country be run on multiracial lines and that all are equal before the law.
Malaysia would not countenance any challenge to Malay rule.
No ifs and buts over these two existential issues.
In the end, it wasn't, if not separation, what? But how quickly to do it before more blood was shed.
Han Fook Kwang was a veteran newspaper editor and is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He is also co-author of the book, Lee Kuan Yew: The man and his ideas, and Lee Kuan Yew: Hard truths to keep Singapore going
Continue reading...