SINGAPORE: The National Environment Agency (NEA) was on Tuesday (Nov 18) fined S$230,000 (US$176,500) for work safety failures that contributed to the death of two of its officers at Tuas Incineration Plant in 2021.
Mr Kwok Yeow Wai, 65, and Mr Wee Eng Leng, 64, died when an explosion occurred in an electrical switch room where they had been sent to troubleshoot a fault.
A third employee, Mr Low Yin Choon, 59, survived the blast with injuries.
The incident occurred on Sep 23, 2021, when the three men were called in to troubleshoot an industrial fan in the incineration plant that could not be switched off.
After unsuccessful attempts to switch the industrial fan off remotely, they went to the switch room to try to do this.
In the process, either Mr Kwok or Mr Wee disconnected the circuit breaker from the switch while a live current was still flowing. This "racking out" with a live current was against safety regulations.
It resulted in an upflash explosion in the switch room. All three men, who were not wearing suitable fire-retardant gear, were injured in the blast.
Mr Kwok was pronounced dead at the scene and Mr Wee died in hospital three days later. Mr Low was hospitalised with severe burns over 27 per cent of his body surface area.
A forensic examination found another factor leading to the blast: the automatic tripping, which was a safety feature, did not occur because a piston in the circuit breaker had worn out over time and dislodged, jamming the mechanism.
Defence counsel Mr Jason Chan told the court that NEA deeply regretted the situation and that it was "deeply painful" for the agency.
"Mr Kwok and Mr Wee were cherished and very senior employees of NEA," said the lawyer.
Mr Kwok, a senior engineering manager, and Mr Wee, an executive engineering manager, each had more than 40 years of experience in electrical maintenance work at the time.
NEA pleaded guilty to one charge under the Workplace Safety and Health Act, covering three work safety failures.
First, NEA did not ensure that its permit-to-work system for high-voltage switchgear racking works complied with Electricity (Electrical Installations) Regulations.
According to regulations, only an authorised engineer can issue the permit to work, and the permit must be issued to "competent persons".
But on the day of the incident, the permit to work was not issued by the authorised engineer. He was not notified of the faulty industrial fan and was not asked to issue any permit.
Mr Kwok and Mr Wee were also not "competent persons" to carry out such works.
The prosecution said this happened because NEA's permit-to-work system did not expressly require the authorised engineer to issue the permit, and charged other engineers with doing this even though they were not authorised.
The authorised engineer was also supposed to supervise such works or delegate supervision to another competent person. But this did not happen on the day, as he was not notified of the team's intended works.
Investigations further found that NEA's engineers had been carrying out high-voltage switchgear racking works without the supervision of an authorised engineer for several years.
Second, NEA did not provide maintenance workers at Tuas Incineration Plant with suitable personal protective equipment, which should have included fire-retardant clothing.
This was despite NEA identifying the risk of flashover and burns in its own risk assessment.
Instead, the workers wore an NEA-issued uniform that had no fire-retardant qualities. NEA also provided them with helmets, goggles, gloves and safety shields.
Third, NEA did not establish safe work procedures for the type of work that the team was carrying out on the day, therefore failing to control foreseeable risks.
The prosecution noted that NEA has since rectified each of these failures after the incident.
Only licensed electrical workers and competent persons can now carry out high-voltage switchgear racking works. The work functions of the engineering team involved in the incident were limited.
NEA also moved to prescribe suitable safety gear, including an upflash protection suit, and established and disseminated safe work procedures for such works.
Deputy Principal District Judge Luke Tan took NEA's post-incident response into consideration in reducing the sentence.
He said this included measures that exceed regulatory requirements, such as setting up a panel of licensed electrical workers to advise on works involving high-voltage equipment.
Tuas Incineration Plant was decommissioned in 2022 after 36 years of operations.
Two other NEA employees have also been charged with work safety failures. Their cases are still before the courts.
They are Ng Wah Yong, the general manager of Tuas Incineration Plant, and another NEA officer, Christopher Lee Yew Binn.
NEA previously said that both men were redeployed to non-operational roles pending the outcome of the legal proceedings.
The agency could have been fined up to S$500,000 for failing to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and health of employees at work.
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Mr Kwok Yeow Wai, 65, and Mr Wee Eng Leng, 64, died when an explosion occurred in an electrical switch room where they had been sent to troubleshoot a fault.
A third employee, Mr Low Yin Choon, 59, survived the blast with injuries.
The incident occurred on Sep 23, 2021, when the three men were called in to troubleshoot an industrial fan in the incineration plant that could not be switched off.
After unsuccessful attempts to switch the industrial fan off remotely, they went to the switch room to try to do this.
In the process, either Mr Kwok or Mr Wee disconnected the circuit breaker from the switch while a live current was still flowing. This "racking out" with a live current was against safety regulations.
It resulted in an upflash explosion in the switch room. All three men, who were not wearing suitable fire-retardant gear, were injured in the blast.
Mr Kwok was pronounced dead at the scene and Mr Wee died in hospital three days later. Mr Low was hospitalised with severe burns over 27 per cent of his body surface area.
A forensic examination found another factor leading to the blast: the automatic tripping, which was a safety feature, did not occur because a piston in the circuit breaker had worn out over time and dislodged, jamming the mechanism.
Defence counsel Mr Jason Chan told the court that NEA deeply regretted the situation and that it was "deeply painful" for the agency.
"Mr Kwok and Mr Wee were cherished and very senior employees of NEA," said the lawyer.
Mr Kwok, a senior engineering manager, and Mr Wee, an executive engineering manager, each had more than 40 years of experience in electrical maintenance work at the time.
THREE WORK SAFETY FAILURES
NEA pleaded guilty to one charge under the Workplace Safety and Health Act, covering three work safety failures.
First, NEA did not ensure that its permit-to-work system for high-voltage switchgear racking works complied with Electricity (Electrical Installations) Regulations.
According to regulations, only an authorised engineer can issue the permit to work, and the permit must be issued to "competent persons".
But on the day of the incident, the permit to work was not issued by the authorised engineer. He was not notified of the faulty industrial fan and was not asked to issue any permit.
Mr Kwok and Mr Wee were also not "competent persons" to carry out such works.
The prosecution said this happened because NEA's permit-to-work system did not expressly require the authorised engineer to issue the permit, and charged other engineers with doing this even though they were not authorised.
The authorised engineer was also supposed to supervise such works or delegate supervision to another competent person. But this did not happen on the day, as he was not notified of the team's intended works.
Investigations further found that NEA's engineers had been carrying out high-voltage switchgear racking works without the supervision of an authorised engineer for several years.
Second, NEA did not provide maintenance workers at Tuas Incineration Plant with suitable personal protective equipment, which should have included fire-retardant clothing.
This was despite NEA identifying the risk of flashover and burns in its own risk assessment.
Instead, the workers wore an NEA-issued uniform that had no fire-retardant qualities. NEA also provided them with helmets, goggles, gloves and safety shields.
Third, NEA did not establish safe work procedures for the type of work that the team was carrying out on the day, therefore failing to control foreseeable risks.
RECTIFICATION OF FAILURES
The prosecution noted that NEA has since rectified each of these failures after the incident.
Only licensed electrical workers and competent persons can now carry out high-voltage switchgear racking works. The work functions of the engineering team involved in the incident were limited.
NEA also moved to prescribe suitable safety gear, including an upflash protection suit, and established and disseminated safe work procedures for such works.
Deputy Principal District Judge Luke Tan took NEA's post-incident response into consideration in reducing the sentence.
He said this included measures that exceed regulatory requirements, such as setting up a panel of licensed electrical workers to advise on works involving high-voltage equipment.
Tuas Incineration Plant was decommissioned in 2022 after 36 years of operations.
Two other NEA employees have also been charged with work safety failures. Their cases are still before the courts.
They are Ng Wah Yong, the general manager of Tuas Incineration Plant, and another NEA officer, Christopher Lee Yew Binn.
NEA previously said that both men were redeployed to non-operational roles pending the outcome of the legal proceedings.
The agency could have been fined up to S$500,000 for failing to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and health of employees at work.
Continue reading...